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Abstract
The primary method by which social scientists describe public opinion about science and technology is 
to present frequencies from fixed response survey questions and to use multivariate statistical models 
to predict where different groups stand with regard to perceptions of risk and benefit. Such an approach 
requires measures of individual preference which can be aligned numerically in an ordinal or, preferably, a 
continuous manner along an underlying evaluative dimension – generally the standard 5- or 7-point attitude 
question. The key concern motivating the present paper is that, due to the low salience and “difficult” 
nature of science for members of the general public, it may not be sensible to require respondents to 
choose from amongst a small and predefined set of evaluative response categories. Here, we pursue a 
different methodological approach: the analysis of textual responses to “open-ended” questions, in which 
respondents are asked to state, in their own words, what they understand by the term “DNA.” To this 
textual data we apply the statistical clustering procedures encoded in the Alceste software package to 
detect and classify underlying discourse and narrative structures. We then examine the extent to which the 
classifications, thus derived, can aid our understanding of how the public develop and use “everyday” images 
of, and talk about, biomedicine to structure their evaluations of emerging technologies.
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1. Introduction
A persistent dilemma within science governance is the question of how to deal with the democratic 
demands placed upon regulatory and legislative institutions when technologies are being rapidly 
developed and applied, and the public and policy makers struggle to keep pace with their uses, 
implications, risks, and benefits (Ruckelshaus, 1986; Kleinman, 2000; Salter and Jones, 2006). 
Historically, science governance has been a policy domain driven almost entirely by “elites,” with 
little opportunity for the preferences of the general public, such as they are, to feed into funding and 
regulatory decision-making. In response to this apparent “democratic deficit,” a range of public 
engagement and consultation procedures have been established over the past ten to fifteen years, 
with the goal of enabling ordinary citizens to have more influence on the direction of science pol-
icy and practice (Salter and Jones, 2002; Frewer and Salter, 2007). These include citizens’ juries, 
such as the NanoJury UK (Rogers-Hayden and Pidgeon, 2006), consensus conferences (Joss and 
Durant, 1995), deliberative mapping (Burgess et al., 2007), and focus groups (Holliman, 2005) 
which all aim, in one way or another, to bring ordinary members of the general public into closer 
engagement with the technical, social, and ethical issues around new and emerging science and 
technology. While such strategies have all met with varying degrees of success, they nonetheless 
face the charge that, being based on small and self-selecting samples, they do not adequately reflect 
the true distribution of views and preferences within the public as a whole (see Holliman, 2005: 
257–258; Middendorf and Busch, 1997; Rowe and Frewer, 2000: 12–13).
Although not generally conceived of as being part of the apparatus of public engagement, a cru-
cial link between science and the public – and one which has considerably stronger claims to repre-
sent the full distribution of public opinion – is social surveys and opinion polls. These are the key 
conduit through which public opinion and preferences regarding the speed and direction of policy, 
including that relating to science and technology, are presently communicated to governmental and 
non-governmental institutions and stakeholders (Wlezien, 2005; Althaus, 2008). It is also, of course, 
through the findings of opinion polls and attitude surveys that the media often intervene to report on 
public fears about, or hostility towards, an area of scientific practice, often in the form of a headline 
grabbing majority rejecting a particular technology or idea for future application. The motivation 
underlying this paper, however, is the oft-cited observation that standard “closed-format” survey 
questions are not ideal instruments for delineating complex, dynamic, and potentially “un-formed” 
preferences about science and technology within the general public (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Sturgis 
and Allum, 2004; Nisbet and Goidel, 2007). This is because, when a technology is unfamiliar and 
cognitively demanding to understand, from both a technical and an ethical perspective, it seems 
unlikely that survey designers will be capable of pre-determining the full range of responses that 
might be given by members of the public about it, when asked. Under such conditions, it is certainly 
possible that the standard closed-format survey question does not so much reveal pre-existing public 
opinion about the technology in question, as create it, a critique that has long dogged the social 
survey more generally (Moscovici, 1963; Converse, 1964; Bishop, 2004).
In recognising that closed-ended questions may constrain or distort our understanding of public 
responses to new scientific issues and technologies, we explore in this paper whether quantitative 
analysis of unstructured, verbatim responses to “open-ended” survey questions can provide a solu-
tion to the problems associated with measuring public opinion about techno-science via a narrow 
and pre-determined set of fixed alternatives. To be sure, the approach we apply here – so-called 
“quantitizing” of qualitative data (Sandelowski, Voils and Knafl, 2009) – is just one way of com-
bining qualitative and quantitative methods, and one that might, indeed, stand accused of merely 
transforming the qualitative into the quantitative as opposed to being a genuinely integrative 
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approach. Be that as it may, our goal here is not to resolve such definitional issues of method but 
to explore, pragmatically, whether this particular approach might be a useful tool for the analysis 
of public understandings of, and reactions to, new and emerging areas of science. The remainder 
of the paper is set out as follows. First, we describe the social and political context in which the 
elicitation of public opinion about science and technology is situated, before reviewing some of the 
methodological challenges that arise when asking questions about low-salience and cognitively 
demanding societal issues. We then describe the data and key measures upon which our analysis is 
based and present our key results. We conclude with a discussion of the substantive implications of 
our findings and an evaluation of the methodology employed.
2. Science policy and public opinion
The nature and direction of public opinion is a key battleground for political elites and commenta-
tors on a wide range of policy issues, with the domain of science and technology being no excep-
tion. The primary reason for this is simple: it is the manifestation of a struggle for legitimacy. 
Where the appropriate course of action is uncertain and contested, principles of representative 
democracy mean that having “the public on your side” can provide decisive momentum in debates 
over the speed and direction of policy (Dahl, 1989). As recent time-series evidence has shown, 
governments appear to be responsive to short and long run movements in prominent public opinion 
polls relating to the relative priorities for government spending – the so-called “thermostatic 
model” of the relationship between public opinion and policy making (Wlezien, 2005; Soroka and 
Wlezien, 2011).
Yet, in affording the notion of public opinion a normative role in the formulation of policy, 
particularly between elections, how “public opinion” is measured and interpreted becomes not just 
a technical scientific challenge but also a question of democratic legitimacy. For, in treating public 
opinion as coterminous with what is measured by opinion polls, there is a real danger that the “will 
of the people” might easily be misrepresented as a result of technical shortcomings or deliberate 
malpractice by vested interests who wish to push for a particular legislative or regulatory position 
(Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). In short, the idea that policy makers are responsive to opinion polls is 
comforting only insofar as polls and surveys can be taken as accurately reflecting the “true” state 
of public opinion. However, there are numerous examples from the empirical record that should 
give us pause for thought before accepting the idea that opinion polls are an unproblematic way of 
measuring the pre-formed attitudes residing in the heads of survey respondents. To name but a few 
prominent examples, survey respondents have been shown to willingly offer opinions on non-
existent issues (Bennett, 1975; Bishop, Hamilton and McConahay, 1980; Sturgis and Smith, 2010); 
to switch from one side to the other of prominent issues in a quasi-random manner over time 
(Converse, 1964; Iyengar, 1973; Asher, 1974; Sturgis, 2002); and to provide very different answers 
depending on the way in which questions are administered to them (Schuman and Presser, 1981).
In the area of science policy, these reservations have been evident in recent controversies about 
biotechnology. The GM Nation? debate in the UK in 2003, for example, found that 86% of the 
public were against eating genetically modified food. This figure received high profile media cov-
erage but was out of line with contemporaneous high quality survey evidence (Sturgis et al., 2004), 
a discrepancy likely to reflect the self-selecting nature of the sample design and the ability of lobby 
groups to deliberately over-represent themselves in the achieved sample (Pidgeon et al., 2005). In 
2008, following the creation of “part-human, part-animal” embryos, the Daily Mail newspaper 
reported that “two out of three people are against the creation of hybrid embryos,”1 a figure gener-
ated from a survey commissioned by the Catholic Church which asked respondents whether they 
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“support or oppose allowing scientists to create embryos which are part-human part animal.” 
However, according to independent surveys, which posed the question in a less value-laden man-
ner, less than half of the British public were opposed to this practice (Jones, 2009: 169).
3. Closed-ended questions and non-attitudes
In the examples described above, “closed-format” measures of public opinion from surveys and 
polls played a key role in shaping the public debate on science policy. Respondents to these surveys 
were asked to express their position by selecting one of a limited number of pre-specified evalua-
tive descriptors relating to a statement about the technology in question, such as “agree” or 
“strongly agree.” The limitations of the random sample survey for uncovering the complexities and 
dynamism of public opinion are well known (Blumer, 1969; Herbst, 1992), and our central concern 
here is that, in constraining the range of opinions available to be expressed to a predefined set of 
answers that are themselves selected by the researcher (or funder), we obtain a representation of 
public opinion which is “rigged” in advance to reflect the (often implicit) assumptions of those 
who commissioned and designed the survey (Mayer and Stirling, 2004).
In addition to the potential for closed-ended questions to shape or steer responses in a particular 
direction, a further consideration is that even when people have little or no understanding of the 
science they are being asked to evaluate, many will select one of the fixed alternatives offered to 
them rather than admit ignorance, simply because the formalities and conventions of the survey 
interview stipulate that providing answers is “what you are supposed to do” (Converse, 1964; 
Bishop et al., 1980). These types of “non-attitudes,” or “pseudo-opinions” can represent a large 
proportion of all responses on questions about issues of scientific complexity and are, unsurpris-
ingly, more prevalent amongst the less scientifically knowledgeable members of the public (Sturgis 
and Smith, 2010). For these reasons, it seems sensible to ask whether close-ended questions are the 
most appropriate way of understanding public opinion about complex areas of science and technol-
ogy, particularly if the results are intended to feed into policy and regulatory decision-making.
4. The potential value of open-ended questions
An obvious alternative to presenting a set of fixed response alternatives is to ask respondents to 
report their thoughts and perspectives on a particular issue in their own words and for interviewers 
to record these responses “verbatim.” The potential advantage of this type of “open-ended” ques-
tion is that it allows the respondent to use his or her own frame of reference in determining a 
response, even if this might seem inappropriate or “irrational” to the survey designer or analyst. 
Thus, this approach should result in a fuller and more heterogeneous set of perspectives than the 
standard closed-format question. Additionally, of course, the amount of information about an indi-
vidual’s position on an issue that can be derived from an open question is considerably greater than 
that which is afforded by a closed-ended alternative. And, indeed, many large scale academic sur-
veys have employed open-ended questions, particularly in the pioneering period of survey research 
in the United States, during the post-war era (Converse, 1987). Most notable in this regard is the 
American National Election Survey series which has fielded open-ended questions on American 
political issues since the 1940s and which formed the basis of the important idea that the American 
public can be stratified into different “levels” of ideological sophistication, based on the content of 
responses to these questions (Converse, 1964).
Despite their appeal as a means of avoiding the shortcomings of fixed response alternative ques-
tions, open-ended questions are not widely used in survey research today. One reason for this is 
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that concerns have long been raised about whether open-ended questions favour the articulate and 
well-educated, who are likely to provide longer and potentially richer responses and, thereby, exert 
a disproportionate influence on public policy (see Sturgis and Allum, 2006; though see Greer, 1988 
for a counter-position). On a more practical level, open-ended questions are not used frequently 
due to the high cost of fielding these questions because they take longer for interviewers to admin-
ister and require additional resources to transcribe and to code into a frame. Even when open-ended 
questions are included in a survey, it is rare for analysts to use them in a way that exploits the rich-
ness of the additional information provided by the full-text strings. Instead, they are generally 
employed by analysts in a quantitative manner, as if the question had been asked in a closed-ended 
format in the first place, raising further questions about the returns for the additional cost of includ-
ing them. It is clear that, partly, this tendency is a result of “habitual practices”; quantitative 
researchers using the procedures which they are comfortable and familiar with. It is also, however, 
due to the fact that there are few well-established procedures for using verbatim responses in any 
other way, beyond their occasional use as quotations to offer a “flavour” of the kinds of things 
people said, alongside a conventional quantitative analysis. What is needed, then, is a more system-
atic and robust methodology for the analysis of open-ended survey questions that is capable of 
utilising the rich semantic information of the verbatim responses, but in a way that retains the pos-
sibility of reliable population inference.
A response to this methodological challenge has been the development of “Computer Assisted 
Text Analysis” (Brier and Hopp, 2010) otherwise known as CAQDAS (“Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software”) approaches (Fielding and Cisneros-Puebla, 2009). Moving 
beyond mere word counts, these approaches and their associated software utilise quantitative tech-
niques such as multidimensional scaling (MDS) and correspondence analysis (CA) to identify 
structures within a piece of text based on the co-occurrence of words (see Murtagh, 2005 for an 
extensive and technical review of the latter). This enables the analysis of large amounts of text in a 
way which inductively classifies and visualises different themes and narratives (Lebart, Salem and 
Berry, 1998). In particular, these approaches have been applied by researchers interested in the 
meanings contained within political speeches (Bara, Weale and Bicquelet, 2007; Lowe et al., 
2011), manifestos (Laver and Garry, 1999) and even novels (Hawthorne, 1994). As can be seen 
from these examples, these approaches have been used to analyse texts which can generally be 
characterised as long and complex. In this paper we apply the approach to much shorter and sim-
pler open-ended survey questions.
5. Data and measures
We base our analyses on data from the 2010 Wellcome Trust Monitor of public knowledge, interest 
and engagement in biomedical science. The Monitor is a stratified, clustered probability sample, 
with the Postcode Address File (PAF) used as the sampling frame of households. One adult mem-
ber, aged 18 or above, of each responding household was randomly selected for interview using the 
Kish grid procedure (Kish, 1962). The survey achieved a response rate of 59%, yielding 1,179 
adults as our analytical sample size (see Butt et al., 2009 for full technical details of the survey). 
The strength of the Monitor for our purposes here is that, while predominantly employing standard 
closed-ended questions, it also contains several open-ended questions, in which respondents were 
asked to say, in their own words, what came to mind when they heard a particular scientific term 
or phrase. The interviewer transcribed the verbatim reply given by each respondent and it is these 
free-form text responses on which we base our analysis. Owing to restrictions of space, we focus 
here on a single question which asks respondents to report what comes to mind when they hear the 
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term “DNA.” Analyses of an additional question on “stem cells,” which show a broadly similar 
pattern of results are reported more fully in Stoneman, Sturgis and Allum (2011). In order to avoid 
asking people to talk openly about something they have never heard of, respondents were first 
asked to rate their level of awareness of the term.2 Only respondents who indicated that they 
thought they had some understanding of DNA were then administered the following question 
“What do you understand by the term ‘DNA’?” Interviewers were instructed to record, verbatim, 
the answers respondents provided to these questions.
6. Analytical approach
Our analysis uses the set of statistical procedures encoded in the software package Alceste 
(Reinert, 1998) to cluster verbatim responses to open survey questions into groupings which 
reflect common underlying narrative structures. In conceptual terms, an Alceste analysis seeks to 
inductively reveal common narratives or discourses within a body of textual data. In the context 
of biomedical applications, for example, we can think of there being different ways in which 
individuals will conceptualise, understand and evaluate the term DNA and that this cognitive and 
affective variation will be reflected in the ways in which people speak about it. Thus, the proce-
dure can be used as a means of uncovering the latent social-cognitive basis of the verbatim 
responses in a way that enables the structure to emerge from people’s actual talk, rather than being 
imposed, a priori, by the researcher. Alceste does not use extensive dictionaries of semantic cat-
egories for its primary analysis but, rather, it relies on the distribution of words within a body of 
text, often referred to as a “corpus.” Indications of meaning can be inferred by the researcher via 
the examination of the characteristic classes of words, which form the primary output of the 
program.
The Alceste program carries out a sequence of textual processing and statistical analysis proce-
dures in order to produce its final output. The first of these is Recognition of dictionary words in 
the corpus. During this stage, a dictionary of common functional words such as prepositions, defi-
nite and indefinite articles, pronouns and so on is identified, so that these can be treated separately 
in the analysis. These word tokens are not used in the generation of the classes of characteristic 
substantive words that are the focus of the analysis. However, they are not discarded altogether but 
can be projected back into the classes after they have been generated, to uncover variation in the 
context of substantive words. For example, it would be possible to identify negative connotations 
of the substantive term “allowed” if “no,” “not” and “never” are identified as frequently occurring 
alongside this word. The next stage is referred to as Lemmatisation, which is the process whereby 
verbs and nouns are reduced to their shortest stem. This means that, for instance, “gene,” “genes,” 
and “genetics” would all be lemmatised to “gene+,” where the “+” indicates that more than one 
suffix has been detected for the common term “gene.” The purpose of this procedure is to render 
different versions of functionally equivalent words synonymous, in order that they are not treated 
as separate entities in the analysis. The automated lemmatisation procedure leaves open the pos-
sibility that some words are incorrectly allocated to a particular stem, such as “generously” to 
“gene+.” This was assessed manually and a small number of corrections to the default lemmatisa-
tions were identified and corrected.
The third stage is referred to as Parsing of the text into “context units.” With a large corpus of 
semi-structured text, such as focus group interview transcripts, Alceste has a procedure for parsing 
the text into smaller analysable chunks, which are referred to as elementary context units (ECUs). 
In the present case, because we have comparatively short text strings, we set the ECUs to be coter-
minous with the complete response for each respondent. Once these data preparation and 
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management procedures have been implemented, a Hierarchical descending classification of 
words by ECU is carried out to produce word “classes.” A contingency table is generated from a 
matrix containing the ECUs in the row and the words (presence or absence of all substantive words 
in the corpus) as the column variables. The program begins with all of the ECUs as one class and 
then iteratively splits the corpus into two maximally distinct sub-classes according to a Chi-square 
criterion. In other words, the ECUs are first split into two groups and the group indicator is cross-
tabulated with the words. This procedure is a variant of hierarchical divisive cluster analysis 
(Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 2005). The squared difference between the observed and the expected 
word frequencies is then evaluated. This process is repeated until the two maximally different 
classes are found in terms of the distribution of words.
In a final stage, the set of derived classes is cross-tabulated with the words in the corpus and 
subjected to a correspondence analysis. This is a geometric technique for visualising the variation 
in a contingency table in a low-dimensional space (Greenacre, 2007) and can be thought of as 
analogous to a principal components analysis for categorical variables. The output from this analy-
sis can be used to identify the proximity of words and classes to each other along the key dimen-
sions of variation.
7. Results
Before presenting the results of the Alceste analyses, it is useful to provide some descriptive infor-
mation about the nature of the responses provided to the open-ended question which asked respon-
dents to think about “DNA.” The proportion of individuals who did not provide any verbatim 
material at all was just over 10%. This figure includes those respondents who said they had not 
heard of DNA, so were not asked the open-ended question, along with the small number of respon-
dents who were asked the question but did not provide any verbatim response (17 for DNA). 
Nonetheless, close to 90% of respondents offered some form of response, indicating that there is 
widespread familiarity with the term.
The most frequently used terms to describe DNA were: “gene,” “make up,” “person,” “individ-
ual,” “cell” and “unique.” This suggests that the general narrative around DNA is that it is related to 
genetics and it is part of what makes individuals different from one another. There are also some not 
so intuitive terms such as “fingerprint” and “blood” which would seem to be related to respondents 
linking DNA with criminal investigations. These potentially different ways of thinking about DNA 
can be seen in the examples below which are from the verbatim responses (the respondent’s unique 
serial number is in parentheses):
(111171) A unique human fingerprint
(112051) Body’s blueprint; specific to you as an individual
(133201) Double helix – the blue print of life
(141111) It’s the code that is passed on to your personality
These four examples demonstrate the idea of DNA being the basic code upon which our individual-
ity is built, making us “who we are.” In this sense, DNA is defined in terms of what it does. But 
there are also many “non-functional” accounts of DNA offered. Compare the first and second pair 
of responses below:
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(111231) Used to determine the true father of a child
(138011) What I have seen on police things – they take swabs out of your mouth if you’ve been to a certain 
place
(123121) Deoxyribonucleic acid is the formation/structure of the cell nucleus to determine the character of 
any living organism
(127191) Coil of atoms
The first pair focus on how our knowledge about DNA is applied to everyday life, with genetic 
parentage and criminal investigations as examples. The second pair offer ontological definitions of 
DNA, which in strict technical terms is the most accurate type of response. Nonetheless, even 
when offering this type of response, we can see from the two examples above that the first one is 
full and completely accurate while the second, whilst trying to define what DNA actually is (as 
opposed to what it does or how it is applied) relies on a visual representation and not a technical 
definition.
Of course, there are severe methodological weaknesses with relying on subjective scanning of 
the verbatim responses and the selection of “illustrative” quotes. First, it uses information from 
only a tiny fraction of the total sample and, second, there is no way of telling how “representative” 
these selections really are.
8.  Alceste analysis of the DNA verbatim responses
The results of the Alceste cluster analysis showed that there are seven classes of verbatim responses. 
The not-asked category (11.3%) is comprised almost entirely of those who said they were not 
familiar with the term DNA and so were not asked the verbatim question. There is a second non-
substantive group of respondents who provided some verbatim response to the open-ended ques-
tion but whom it was not possible to allocate to one of the narrative classes. This group is labelled 
“unclassified” and comprises almost a quarter of all respondents. For those who were allocated to 
one of the five substantive classes, class 1 is the biggest (23.7%) followed by class 2 (15.9%), class 
3 (10.6%), class 4 (8.1%) and finally class 5 (7.8%). There is a good deal of variation in the number 
of unique words found within each class. Class 2 is the most numerous with 69 unique words, 
while classes 3 and 5 have 44 and 38 terms respectively. Classes 1 and 4 are very homogeneous 
with only 20 and 19 unique words in them respectively.
To aid the interpretation of what the narrative structures and discourses underlying the substan-
tive class formations are, Table 1 shows the most common words defining each class. Class 1 is 
defined by a discourse about genetic make-up. People understand that DNA defines individuality 
in some way, related to genes, that is, they focus on the direct effect of DNA on people. Representative 
verbatim responses within this class include “make up of a persons cells which makes each person 
an individual” and “your genes and cells your body is made up of.” Class 2, on the other hand, 
appears to be focused on the function and uses of DNA testing, such as proving paternity and solv-
ing crimes by taking samples of blood or other tissues. As such, this class seems to capture a view 
about DNA primarily informed by how the term commonly arises in popular culture and one that 
is largely absent of technical terms, evident through verbatim responses such as “its taking samples 
of blood or tissue to identify murder victims or fathers of children” and “blood tests that you take 
to identify you and to prove that you are the parent of a child.”
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Class 3 consists of what appear to be, in many cases, a scientifically accurate description of 
DNA, with the vast majority of responses offering a more technical definition such as “the double 
helix structure carrying all the gene information colour of eyes etc” and “deoxyrybo nucleic acid 
the building blocks of all life.” Class 4 also contains statements that accurately describe the nature 
of DNA, but in contrast to class 3, there is an absence of “technical” language. These responses are 
couched in terms of a blueprint or a signature, such as “it is the basic molecular structure of living 
things a unique footprint” and “its the basic blueprint for all living things,” with little biological or 
technical knowledge evident. With class 5, DNA is described in terms of how it can be used to 
identify people and how it can be thought of as analogous to a “fingerprint,” but, importantly, a lot 
more uncertainty is expressed, with responses such as “cant explain everyones dna is different” and 
“not everyone has the same dna don t know any more” being relatively common in this class.
What we have then are broadly three sets of classes: class 2 offers a rather general description, 
focusing on how DNA is used in medicine and criminal investigations, while individuals within 
classes 3 and 4, and to a lesser extent class 1, offer a direct definition of what DNA actually is (an 
“ontological” definition), with class 3 demonstrating more technical knowledge than classes 1 and 
4. Finally, class 5 contains individuals who only tentatively offer a definition and are quite honest 
that they lack confidence in what they are expressing.
The Alceste-generated contingency table which outlines the clusters and associated key words 
can be presented graphically as a correspondence plot which will identify similarities and/or differ-
ences between the classes. From Figure 1, we can see that all of the descriptive discourse is on the 
right hand side of the chart, while the more function-based classes appear on the left. Thus, we can 
think of members of the public being positioned on a dimension from description to functionality 
in relation to DNA. The accurate description in class 3 is the most distinctive class, in terms of its 
distance to the middle of both horizontal and vertical axes, and in terms of the distance between it 
and the other classes. Respondents in class 3 appear, then, to be the most distinct group.
9. Do the narrative classes have explanatory power?
Thus far we have shown that the verbatim responses can be partitioned into substantively interpre-
table groupings that vary with respect to how people talk about an aspect of biomedical science 
when asked to do so in their own terms. An important additional consideration is to what extent 
these derived classes possess explanatory, as well as descriptive power. The Alceste-generated 
classes are intended to represent different ways of thinking about DNA, and it is illuminating to 
explore whether this dimension of variation provides additional analytical leverage in explaining 
relevant attitudinal dimensions. We therefore used class membership dummy variables in regres-
sion models alongside a set of “standard” explanatory variables to predict an attitudinal indicator 
of optimism about medical science and genetic research. The wording and response alternatives for 
this attitude item were:
“How optimistic are you about the possibility of medical advances as a result of genetic research?” (1 = 
very optimistic; 2 = somewhat optimistic; 3 = not too optimistic; 4 = not at all optimistic)
The frequency distribution for this variable is presented in the Appendix. Owing to the positive 
skew of the density function, this variable was re-coded into binary form, where “not too optimis-
tic” and “not at all optimistic” are coded 0 and “somewhat optimistic” and “very optimistic” are 
coded 1. Nested binary logistic regression models were then used to predict the probability of 
being “somewhat optimistic”/“very optimistic” about the medical benefits of genetic research.
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Because the narrative classes appear to partially reflect differences in understanding of what 
DNA is and what it can be used for, it is important to evaluate whether the classes are able to 
account for between-person variability in optimism, over and above conventional measures of 
scientific knowledge (Miller, 2001; Sturgis and Allum, 2004). We also include as covariates a set 
of manually-coded variables which were derived from the same DNA open-ended question accord-
ing to standard procedures (Groves et al., 2009). That is to say, trained coders in the survey data 
collection agency developed and applied thematic categories to the verbatim responses in order to 
transform them into nominal variables. This resulted in seven manually-coded variables indicating 
whether respondents (see Butt et al., 2009):
(1) mentioned the terms “genes,” “genetics” or “genetic make-up”
(2) mentioned DNA as determining human characteristics
(3) focused on practical uses of DNA, such as “solving crimes”
+-----|---------|---------|--------- ---------|---------|---------|-----+ 
|                                   |      out                          |
|                                   |                  information      |
|                  |            understand    organism |
|                                   |            blue spiral    helix acid 
|         up                        |             deoxyribonuc nucleic  |
|      used mother                  |    colour life  protein|
|         down pass                 |                                   |
|father match way                   |                stand       coding |
crime       police see know little  |                             |
| use       take come catch         |  print                            |
|dad to     sample swab criminal    |                                   |
else  same    blood mouth identify  |                                   |
|tell   DNA trace identification   |                                   |
|   people   saliva                 |                               strand 
|   someone can_t identifying  that_s                           develop |
|           show               |        determine give             |
|    look    tissue    skin         |             long living    character 
--------------------hair--leave finger----------------blueprint- ---form 
|   find think              everyone                 molecule 
|                                  thing            define              |
|                                   |             chemical chain        |
|                                   personal molecular                  |
|                   certain part    identity      human                 |
|                                   |    word                           |
|                              different  basic                         |
|                       |              code structure   cell 
|                                   |   footprint basi                  |
|                               into|                                   |
|                                   |           |
|                                fingerprint  go   plant                |
|                                   |          animal                    |
|                                   |             gene                  |
|                                   |        map                        |
|                                   |               make                |
|                         each inherit  person bodies make_up           |
|                   body unique   individual pattern    |
+-----|---------|---------|--------- ---------|---------|---------|-----+ 
X axis 40 % of the inertia
Y axis 28 % of the inertia
Class 3
Class 4
Class 1
Class 2
Class 5
Figure 1. Alceste correspondence analysis: DNA.
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(4) mentioned parts of the body
(5) offered vague or irrelevant answers
(6) said “don’t know”
(7) offered other very specific answers such as “fingerprint.”
Four models are fitted to the data: model 1 tests the unconditional main effect of class membership; 
model 2 introduces covariates; model 3 includes a set of interaction terms between class member-
ship and scientific knowledge. Interaction terms are introduced to test whether the effect of class 
membership is moderated by scientific knowledge. That is, in addition to any direct effect of the 
narrative classes on optimism about genetic science, we also assess whether any effects observed 
vary systematically as a function of other variables in the model. The final model, model 4, intro-
duces the manually-coded variables. Table 2 presents the results. In model 1, we can see that mem-
bership of all the narrative classes is positively associated with optimism relative to class 2 (the 
reference category), with the exception of the “not-asked” group. Classes 1, 3 and 4 are very 
strongly associated, with odds ratios of 3.1, 8.7 and 5.5 respectively. Referring back to the interpre-
tations of these classes, we find that offering an optimistic response to this question is strongly 
associated with offering an ontological definition of DNA as opposed to defining it by its effects or 
functions. This is especially true for class 3, in which respondents offer ontological definitions 
which demonstrate a high degree of technical literacy. When the control variables are introduced 
in model 2, the pattern of results is essentially the same but the magnitude of the coefficients 
declines sharply. Now, a one unit increase in knowledge is associated with being 1.4 times more 
likely to be optimistic and class 1 is no longer a significant predictor. The strongest predictors in 
model 2 are classes 3 and 4, with membership of these classes increasing the odds of an optimistic 
response by 2.8 and 2.6 respectively. These results suggest that the class membership variables, 
though strongly co-linear with science knowledge, appear to capture a dimension of cognitive 
engagement which is distinct from it and is, as a consequence, able to add additional explanatory 
utility where the objective is to understand more general attitudes toward genetic (and other areas 
of) science.
Turning now to model 3, the first thing to note is that the inclusion of the interaction terms 
improves the fit of the model (Nagelkerke R increases from .19 to .23), so we can conclude that 
science knowledge does moderate the effect of the narrative classes on optimism about genetic 
science. There are three significant interaction terms in model 3, with classes 1, 4 and 5 unrelated 
to optimism at any level of knowledge. The main effect coefficients in an interaction model denote 
the main effect of each variable when the other variable in the interaction is at its zero point. The 
interaction coefficient is interpreted as the expected change in each main effect coefficient, with 
each unit increase in the other variable in the interaction (Friedrich, 1982). So, we can see that, at 
the lowest point on the knowledge scale, being in classes “DNA not-asked,” “DNA unclassified” 
and “DNA class 3” is associated with being less optimistic about genetic science relative to class 
2. However, as knowledge increases the negative effects of membership of these classes reduces. 
In short, science knowledge reduces the negative effect on optimism that is associated with these 
narrative classes. In model 4, the inclusion of the manually-coded variables has no effect on the 
significance or substantive interpretation of the Alceste class coefficients. As Table 2 shows, the 
introduction of these variables does add some predictive power, with those offering an explanation 
of DNA around “genetics” twice as likely to express optimism about genetic science (odds ratio = 
2.03), but overall much greater analytical leverage is achieved with the Alceste classes.
To aid the interpretation of statistical interactions, it is useful to produce visual plots of the 
model fitted values. By way of illustration, Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities from model 
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Table 2. Binary logistic regression models predicting optimism about genetic science and medical 
advances.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 B S.E. O/R B S.E. O/R B S.E. O/R B S.E. O/R
Constant 0.95 0.18 2.59 –0.35 0.51 0.79 1.24 0.71 3.47 0.98 0.75 2.66
Age 22–34 (ref: 18–21) –0.69 0.45 0.50 –0.71 0.46 0.49 –0.70 0.47 0.50
Age 35–44 –0.04 0.44 0.96 –0.09 0.46 0.92 –0.05 0.46 0.95
Age 45–59 –0.34 0.42 0.71 –0.34 0.44 0.71 –0.32 0.45 0.72
Age 60 + –0.05 0.43 0.95 –0.07 0.44 0.94 –0.01 0.44 0.99
Male (ref: female) 0.10 0.18 1.10 0.11 0.18 1.11 0.13 0.18 1.14
No qualification (ref: 
GCSE/A level)
–0.37 0.21 0.69 –0.41 0.21 0.66 –0.42 0.21 0.66
Degree and above 0.47 0.32 1.60 0.43 0.33 1.53 0.32 0.34 1.38
Interest in science (ref: 
no)
0.32 0.23 1.38 0.31 0.23 1.37 0.25 0.24 1.28
Knowledge 0.32*** 0.06 1.37 0.00 0.11 1.00 0.00 0.11 1.00
Alceste classes  
(ref: class 2)
 
Not-asked –0.38 0.27 0.68 –0.11 0.29 0.90 –2.15** 0.77 0.12 –1.93* 0.81 0.15
Unclassified 0.73** 0.24 2.07 0.37 0.26 1.45 –2.28** 0.81 0.10 –2.18* 0.87 0.11
Class 1 1.13*** 0.26 3.11 0.49 0.28 1.63 0.43 1.07 1.53 0.65 1.09 1.92
Class 3 2.16*** 0.45 8.65 1.04* 0.48 2.83 –8.81** 3.07 0.00 –8.87** 3.20 0.00
Class 4 1.71*** 0.44 5.54 0.97* 0.46 2.64 –0.58 2.05 0.56 –0.23 2.05 0.79
Class 5 0.78* 0.34 2.19 0.43 0.35 1.54 –1.23 1.41 0.29 –1.06 1.43 0.35
Not-asked*knowledge 0.44** 0.16 1.55 0.44** 0.16 1.55
Unclassified*knowledge 0.52*** 0.15 1.69 0.52*** 0.16 1.68
Class 1*knowledge 0.08 0.17 1.08 0.02 0.17 1.02
Class 3*knowledge 1.65** 0.53 5.21 1.68** 0.55 5.39
Class 4*knowledge 0.31 0.33 1.37 0.28 0.33 1.33
Class 5*knowledge 0.33 0.25 1.40 0.32 0.25 1.37
Manually-coded  
variables (ref: other)
 
Genetics 0.71* 0.30 2.03
Parts of the body 0.00 0.26 1.00
Characteristics 0.08 0.23 1.08
Practical uses 0.23 0.30 1.26
Vague/irrelevant –0.09 0.42 0.91
Don’t know 0.32 0.52 1.38
Nagelkerke R .104 .191 .227 .237
N 1179 1179 1179 1179
Notes: Coefficients are logit coefficients; bold coefficients indicate statistical significance where * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01;  
*** p ≤ .001.
4 for the interaction between science knowledge and narrative class 3. Figure 2 shows that, at low 
levels of science knowledge, membership of class 3 is associated with low levels of optimism, 
lower indeed than members of all the remaining groups combined. However, as science knowledge 
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increases, the level of optimism increases rapidly across all respondents but particularly those in 
class 3, until at the highest levels of knowledge those in class 3 are the most optimistic.
Why should this be so? An advantage of the analytical approach we have adopted here is that it 
is possible, at this stage, to return to the full verbatim responses in order to contextualise the coef-
ficients in the statistical model. Put differently, we are able to use the information in the verbatim 
responses to ascertain whether what people say at different points of the interaction can help us to 
understand the mechanisms that may be driving it. To this end, we collated all the verbatim 
responses for respondents in class 3 and compared those with knowledge scores of 5 or below to 
those with knowledge scores of 8 or above. This revealed that, while those in the low knowledge 
group still provided “ontological” statements relating to what DNA is, they did not appear to link 
this directly or indirectly to the possibility that because DNA determines cell function, understand-
ing more about it might lead to medical advances:
(1441111) Building block of life
(1051511) It’s the mapped out life and identity at conception
(1801411) The make-up of life spiral stringy thing they discovered many years ago
These verbatim responses in narrative class 3 can be contrasted with those at the top of the knowl-
edge scale:
Figure 2. Predicted probability of optimism about genetic science by membership of narrative class 3 and 
science knowledge.
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(1171611) deoxyribose nucleic acid the chemicals inside the chromosomes that identify the characteristics 
of an individual
(1980511) it’s a double helix its basically the building block for our body works grows and develops
(1671711) deoxirebulic acid nuclear acid produces all proteins in body and determines all things like eye 
colour and susceptibly to diseases
In these examples, a technical definition of DNA is offered, specifically identifying it as a type of 
acid or mentioning the structural manifestation of double-stranded molecules of nucleic acid, the 
“double helix.” However, these responses also recognise that DNA plays a key role in how the 
human body develops and affects susceptibility to morbidity. There is some evidence in the verba-
tim response, then, that those in narrative class 3 who have a higher level of scientific knowledge, 
also have a better appreciation of genetic science’s potential for medical development and are, as a 
consequence, more optimistic about the potential for advances in the future.
10. Conclusion
It is, perhaps, something of a truism to say that quantitative researchers favour working with large-n 
datasets and testing statistical relationships between variables. Similarly, it seems almost tautological 
to define qualitative researchers as those who prefer the rich textual data that arise out of interviews 
with and observations of a small number of cases. Each tradition is, nonetheless, clearly grounded in 
preferences for different kinds of inference. The quantitative researcher strives for robust generalisa-
tion to the population as a whole and, in doing so, must make compromises over the amount (and 
nature) of the data that can be collected from each case. The qualitative researcher, by the same token, 
eschews the formalisations of population inference for the greater insight that can be gained from 
considering a smaller number of “illustrative” cases, often in very fine detail. In this paper we have 
attempted to combine the strengths of both approaches by “mixing” them within a single research 
design. Although interest in the idea of mixed methodological research has certainly increased sub-
stantially over the past decade and more (Bryman, 2007), it is also undoubtedly true that the goal of 
qualitative and quantitative integration is “more honoured in the breach than in the observance” 
(Greene, Caracelli and Graham, 1989; Niglas, 2004; Bryman, 2006). Our pursuit of methodological 
integration was undertaken due to long-held concerns that, for a variety of reasons, standard fixed-
choice survey questions may not be well-suited to gauging public opinion about relatively novel and 
emerging areas of science and technology (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Kotchetkova, Evans and Langer, 
2007). It has certainly not been our intention to set fixed response alternatives and open textual data 
in binary opposition to one another, with the implication that one is inherently superior to the other. 
Rather, we have sought to explore whether undertaking a direct statistical analysis of verbatim textual 
responses might yield some analytical benefits when assessing public opinion in areas of science and 
technology which are, for many, difficult and of low salience. Our results suggest that there is some 
potential analytical utility for our understanding of public responses to controversial and emerging 
areas of science and technology by applying the rigour and inferential power of quantitative analysis 
to unstructured textual data collected from a large random sample of the general public.
The results of the Alceste analyses have shown that verbatim responses prompted by the term 
“DNA” can be classified into groups which reflect the different ways in which people think and 
speak about the term. That is to say, we are able to uncover latent narrative structures and discourses 
that are evident in the data, rather than imposed a priori through the production of fixed response 
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alternatives. While the interpretation of some of the classes is somewhat ambiguous, three primary 
narrative discourses were evident. For some, the first thing that comes to mind when encountering 
the term “DNA” is how it functions with its ability to create “individuality” which makes us “all 
different” being commonly cited definitions. For others, the term evokes representations of the 
ways in which objects appear in everyday life and the media, with DNA anchored by narratives of 
its uses. For example, to catch criminals via “DNA fingerprinting” or identify paternity through 
genetic testing. A third narrative structure focused on what might be termed more “ontological” 
ways of thinking about DNA, with respondents attempting to provide technical “definitions” of 
what DNA is as opposed to what it does or what it can be used for.
Having demonstrated the descriptive benefits of the Alceste approach in identifying narrative 
discourses around DNA, a logical next step was to assess the analytical utility of the derived 
classes by using them as predictors of a related attitudinal dimension – optimism about genetic 
science – in a regression model. This showed that the Alceste classes were significant predictors of 
optimism about genetic science, even after controlling for standard demographic variables, scien-
tific knowledge, and manually-produced thematic codes, which were derived using standard cod-
ing procedures from the same verbatim DNA responses. Thus, these classes appear to represent 
more than the degree of understanding of scientific “facts” about genetics, or the simple surface 
content of the responses. In addition to their main effect, we also showed that they have a strong 
moderating influence on how knowledge relates to optimism. For example, membership of narra-
tive class 3 was associated with lower levels of optimism relative to the other classes when scien-
tific knowledge was low. However, at higher levels of knowledge, this position switched such that 
membership of class 3 was associated with the highest level of optimism. A particular benefit of 
directly analysing the textual data was that we were able to gain additional insight into potential 
mechanisms underlying this interaction by re-integrating the qualitative data alongside the quanti-
tative results.
Although these procedures offer additional insights relative to a standard quantitative analysis, 
two primary limitations with the approach were evident. The first of these relates to the ontological 
status and meaning of the derived classes. That is to say, some of the derived classes were difficult 
to interpret substantively, given their loose structure of associated words. This difficulty of inter-
preting the substantive meaning of inductively derived latent structures is not unique to Alceste 
(Kline, 2010). Nonetheless, it is clear that the somewhat ambiguous nature of the derived classes, 
despite their evident analytical power, must be considered a limiting feature of this approach, par-
ticularly if the intention is to inform policy interventions and other areas of decision-making. A 
second limitation is that many of the verbatim responses were very short, containing just a few 
words in many instances. Most often, qualitative analysis is carried out on much larger corpora of 
text – paragraphs, speeches, interviews, manifestos or official documents (see for example Bara 
et al., 2007; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2005). As we were working with, on average, just twelve words 
for each unit, our search to uncover latent narrative structure was necessarily constrained. This is 
not, of course, an inherent limitation of the method but clearly indicates the need to implement 
ways of collecting verbatim responses which maximise the semantic content of the data obtained. 
One interesting direction that might be usefully pursued in this regard would be to use audio-
recording of the verbatim responses, which could later be transcribed (possibly via automated 
procedures), rather than using interviewers to type the oral responses manually. Although this, in 
turn, raises important practical and ethical issues relating to respondent consent and confidentiality, 
it is almost certainly the case that for the true power of quantitative textual analysis to be realised, 
the current means of collecting verbatim responses in surveys must catch up with the methods that 
have been developed for analysing them.
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Notes
 1. See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1006594/Two-people-hybrid-embryos.html
 2.  The question wording was, “I’d now like to ask you about your understanding of different scientific terms 
that are used in news stories dealing with medical research. First, when you hear the term DNA, how 
would you rate your understanding of what the term means: 1. I have a very good understanding of what 
DNA means 2. I have a good understanding 3. I have some understanding 4. I have heard the term “DNA” 
but have little understanding of what it means 5. I have not heard the term DNA.” Only respondents 
selecting response alternatives 1–3 were administered the open-ended follow-up question.
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